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Abstract 
Access to clean drinking water is not only a fundamental human right, but also claims a 
big stake in economic growth, poverty reduction and sustainable development. With an 
increase in population, rapid urbanization and increasing income levels, the demand for 
water outstrips public water supply in developing countries. As a result, private water 
production has been promoted in developing countries to achieve greater efficiency 
and expansion in order to supplement public water supply. This study used the contin-
gent valuation method to survey households in three cities in Ghana to estimate their 
willingness to pay in a bid to evaluate a policy of better water supply for urban areas in 
Ghana. It was found that more than 80% of the respondents favour some form of private 
sector engagement in water quality improvement. Also, the mean willingness to pay 
for water quality improvement is about GH¢13.42 (US$12) per month. Given the mean 
household monthly water bill of GH¢10.82, these results indicate that there is demand 
for water quality improvement and the general view is that private sector engagement 
is likely to provide these services. However, the same policy measure will marginalize 
the poor in terms of access to water. Therefore, private sector participation in water de-
livery, with a corresponding complementary government programme to promote access 
to water among low income households, would deliver the double dividends of water 
quality and universal access, which characterize the debate on private sector engage-
ment in water provision in Ghana. 
Keywords: Willingness to pay, water quality, contingent valuation, Ghana 
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11.  Introduction
Rapid urbanization places greater demand on many utility services all over the world. Public water supplies are not spared, what with increased pressure (Bouselly et al., 2006). Access to clean drinking water is a fundamental 
human right that also claims a big stake in sustainable development, economic 
growth and poverty reduction (World Bank, 2003). According to Sobsey (2006), 
a lack of drinking water supplies continues to be a major source of human disease 
and death globally. 
Meanwhile, although access to treated water sources in Ghana has increased, a 
lot has to be done if the supply of improved water is to be sustained (World Bank, 
2003) and to meet the United Nations Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of 
sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation met. Water supply 
in terms of quantity and quality is inadequate in developing countries, including 
Ghana. Ghana faces a serious water crisis because the volume of water effectively 
sold (280,000m3/day) is less than half of the daily demand of 763,300m3/day 
(personal communication with Regional Manager of Ghana Water Company 
Limited, 2007). 
Uninterrupted access to treated and piped water is a luxury in selected parts 
of urban Ghana. It has been estimated that 59% of the population in urban areas 
and about 35% in rural areas have access to potable water. However, many of 
those who have access to potable water are buying from intermediary providers 
because water supply is irregular. Complaints of water shortage in the country 
have escalated, with the hardest hit areas being Ashiaman, McCarthy Hill, Adenta, 
Nima, Nungua and Teshie, all in Accra, as well as in Cape Coast, Takoradi, Tamale, 
Sunyani and Kumasi. The situation in smaller communities is even worse with 
some of them not having access to treated drinking water at all.
Universal access to potable water remains a mirage because of the high 
population growth rates and the low levels of investment in rehabilitation and 
expansion of water infrastructure. At the turn of the millennium, 78% of the 
urban poor were reported not to have regular access to piped water. The World 
Health Organization’s daily requirement for water is 20–40 litres a day per person, 
from a water source that should be located within a reasonable distance from the 
household. However, people outside the piped system or those within the piped 
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system whose pipes are not delivering water, have to walk long distances to get 
just a bucket of water priced at between GH¢0.06 and GH¢0.15, depending on the 
location. Others have to depend entirely on water tankers and power tillers for the 
provision of water.
Ghana needs to substantially increase access to water to 88% if the MDGs 
and the targets of the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) are to be 
met. This requires about $1.3 billion for the rehabilitation and expansion of urban 
water alone (African Development Bank, 2007). 
Previous studies adopted stated preference methods to measure the value of 
improvement in water provision (Hensher et al., 2005; Akram and Olmstead, 
2010; Casey et al., 2006; Whittington et al., 1990; Whittington and Lauria, 1991; 
Whittington et al., 1992; Whittington et al., 2002). The present study attributes 
the improvement in water quality to the participation of the private sector. This 
follows the existing evidence that the engagement of the private sector improves 
quality water delivery and a reduction in the incidence of health problems in urban 
areas (Barrera-Osorio et al., 2009). Moreover, Engel et al. (2005) also note that 
quality perceptions, preferences and opportunity determine households’ choice of 
water source in Ghana. We believe the explicit inclusion of the private sector in 
improving water quality in contingent valuation method (CVM) studies will allow 
an assessment of how consumers would react to private sector participation in 
improving water quality in developing countries. This is because CVM presents 
a given scenario which can be used to assess how the respondents perceive the 
components of the scenario.  
The closest study to ours is that by Whittington et al. (2002), conducted in 
Kathmandu, Nepal. In this study, respondents were requested to choose between 
the existing water supply and an improved water service provided by the private 
sector. The primary objective of the present study was to establish households’ 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the provision of quality drinking water by private 
investors in urban areas in Ghana, and to determine how much these households 
would be prepared to pay towards a monthly water bill.
The secondary objectives were to:
- determine the willingness of urban households in Accra, Cape Coast 
and Sunyani to pay for quality water supply;
- estimate and analyse the determinants of the willingness to pay for 
quality drinking water in Accra, Cape Coast and Sunyani; and
- suggest policy recommendations to help government and private 
operators effectively manage the delivery of water to the urban areas in 
Ghana.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section 
provides an overview of water supply in Ghana, whilst the third section discusses 
the theoretical and econometric models. The literature review is presented in 
Section 4. This is followed by the methodology and results in Sections 5 and 6, 
respectively. The paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications and 
key conclusions. 
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32.  An overview of water supply in 
Ghana
Ghana faces serious constraints in providing adequate water for all rural and urban residents. These include the dire and worsening financial condition of the urban utility provider, Ghana Water Company limited (GWCL), 
insufficient sector investment over the past 10 years, weak implementation 
capacity caused by staffing problems, and low salary levels. The current annual 
GWCL budget is too low to meet the level of investment required to provide a 
safe and accessible water supply. Fuest and Haffner (2007) provide a detailed 
description of the history of the development of the water supply system in Ghana, 
pointing out the history of foreign interventions in the water sector, problems with 
GWCL being the only public provider of water, and the option of having a public 
private partnership (PPP) being considered and implemented  for the sector.
In Ghana, the main sources of water supply for households are pipes from 
treated water sources, untreated piped water from ground water sources, rivers, 
shallow bore-holes, wells and ponds, and lakes and streams. The development of 
public water supplies in Ghana began in the 1920s with a pilot pipe-borne system 
managed by the hydraulic division of the Public Works Department (PWD) in 
Cape Coast. Later a water supply division, with headquarters in Kumasi, was 
established within the Ministry of Works and Housing with responsibility for both 
rural and urban water supplies. In 1958, the Water Supplies Division of the PWD 
became an autonomous entity directly reporting to the Ministry of Works and 
Housing. 
The investment in water infrastructure went through different stages. At 
Independence in 1957, there were about 35 pipe-borne water supply systems 
in the country. Concerning the government’s programme for rapid urban water 
supply expansion and accelerated rural water development, there were 208 pipe-
borne systems and over 6,000 drilled wells fitted with hand pumps by 1990. 
There are two major dams that provide raw water for treatment in the Greater 
Accra Region, namely the Kpong and Weija dams. The estimated rural water 
supply coverage comprises 14,000 drilled boreholes with hand pumps, 12,000 
hand-dug wells with hand pumps and 800 small piped systems. 
The Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC) was established in 1965 
to provide, distribute, conserve and supply water in Ghana for public, domestic 
and industrial purposes. It was also meant to establish, operate and control the 
sewerage system in the country. However, in 1999 the GWSC was converted to 
the GWCL, which was responsible for the planning and development of water 
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supply systems in all urban communities in the country. It was also in charge of the 
provision and maintenance of acceptable levels of service to consumers in respect 
of quantity and quality of water supplied, and the preparation of long-term plans 
in consultation with the appropriate coordinating authority. In 2006 the GWCL 
entered into a five-year management contract with Aqua Vitens Rand Limited 
(AVRL). The AVRL is a joint venture between public Dutch company Vitens 
and public South African company Rand Water. According to the management 
contract, the main objectives of AVRL were to expand a reliable supply of safe 
water in urban areas as well as ensure that low income consumers have access to 
potable water at affordable prices.
Despite these reforms to the water company, the inadequate supply of water 
has not changed. According to the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission of 
Ghana, many urban communities face shortfalls in water supply and the situation 
is even more critical in the smaller cities. These shortfalls are due to the obsolete 
equipment and limited capacity of the supply plants. A study on the national 
water sector assessment carried out in 2005 by WaterAid, a non-governmental 
organization, also showed that the perennial water shortage in most parts of the 
country is as a result of damaged and old pipes, high leakage rates, widespread 
illegal connections, increased demand for potable water for domestic and industrial 
use, and seasonal drought conditions along the catchment areas of the dams.
Due to the persistence of the water problem, households developed different 
measures to overcome it. Most households cope with the water shortage by 
engaging secondary service providers such as water tanker services, domestic 
vendors, harvesting rain water, digging wells, fetching water from streams, and 
using sachet water. These coping strategies deplete the incomes of the households 
that engage these strategies as the secondary service providers charge comparatively 
higher rates for water supplied. A 2002 report by the International Fact-finding 
Mission to Ghana within April and May 2002 on Water Sector Reform shows that 
purchasing a bucket of water a day can cost from ¢600 (6Gp) to ¢1500 (15Gp), 
or between 10% and 20% of the average daily income per capita. On average, a 
2,100-gallon tanker of water in Accra sells for between GH¢40.00 and GH¢60.00, 
depending on how far the household is situated from the source of water supply. 
An average household of five persons may use this quantity for about a month. 
This excludes drinking water, for which most households depend on treated sachet 
water due to the poor quality of water from these secondary sources. 
Lack of adequate funding for the provision of treated water to be supplied to 
the whole urban population seems to be a perennial problem for the GWCL. The 
possible sources of funding in the water sector are: revenue generated by GWCL 
and the Community Water and Sanitation Agency (CWSA); government funding; 
donor funding; long-term loans; and user fees (private sector participation). Until 
1986, the then GWSC depended on government subsidies for both operational 
and development expenditure. In 1986 the government subsidies for operations 
and maintenance ceased, but funding for development programmes continued. 
Consequently, due to the inadequate funding to carry out maintenance and 
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rehabilitation, most of the water supply systems seem to have deteriorated. 
During a national stakeholders’ conference organized by the Water Sector 
Restructuring Secretariat in 1996, it was agreed that private sector participation 
is the best way to accelerate water supply coverage. Private sector participation 
refers to a range of arrangements between a government agency and a non-
public institution (Budds and McGranahan, 2003). Variations of these contractual 
agreements include Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Build-Own-Operate-Train (BOT) 
and Build-Own-Train-Transfer (BOTT). Under the Private Sector Participation 
(PSP) programme, the GWCL assumes the main functions of asset ownership. 
The abstraction, treatment, transmission, storage and distribution of potable water 
for domestic, commercial and industrial use in urban Ghana was taken over by 
the private partner AVRL from 2006 to 2011. The private operator is expected to 
inject technical expertise to improve efficiency in the operation and maintenance 
of the systems. Although the private operator has taken over the management and 
operation of water supply, it is not responsible for making capital improvements to 
this sector under the current terms. Therefore, the only option is cost recovery for 
the delivery of water through tariff increases (Fuest and Haffner, 2007).
The Government of Ghana seeks to engage the private sector in water 
provision in urban areas (Amenga-Etego, 2003). Under this arrangement, private 
organizations would take over the assets of the public provider and produce, 
distribute and manage water supply in urban areas. This has generated a lot of 
public debate in which both the proponents and opponents seek the interest of the 
consumer. The proponents, mainly the government and public agencies, argue that 
private sector participation (PSP) in water provision will improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of water production, leading to an improvement in the quantity and 
quality of water produced. Specifically, the proponents of the PSP seek to use the 
efficiency gains of the PSP to promote access. However, the opponents of the PSP 
in the provision of water, mainly the civil society, and the trade union, argue that 
PSP would make water very expensive and could price it out of reach of the poor. 
They argue further that PSP in the provision of water could lead to a loss of jobs 
(Fuest and Haffner, 2007). 
Opponents of PSP in water provision argue that consumers cannot afford the 
prices that private investors will charge. Meanwhile, credible estimates of WTP 
and other demand assessment strategies could be used to demonstrate that these 
consumers are paying much more than the official tariff rate through informal 
channels and coping strategies, and that they would be willing to pay even more 
to secure better water supply services (Zerah, 2000; Dutta, 2006). For example, 
Whittington et al. (2002) found substantial support among both poor and non-poor 
households for a privatization plan that would improve water supply and require 
all consumers to pay higher bills in South Asia. It would, therefore, be very helpful 
to know how much households would be willing to pay for the current level of 
water service delivery and improved water provision. Recommendations based on 
the outcome could ensure efficient delivery of treated water in urban areas, while 
paying attention to the concerns of the vulnerable and the very poor.
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63.  Theoretical and econometric 
models 
Private sector participation (PSP) has been promoted in water provision with the assumption that it will improve both water quality and quantity, thereby provide a more affordable and efficient service than the public sector. Thus, 
private sector participation in water provision has welfare implications for the 
consumer. The theoretical strategy of the paper was to consider the demand for 
water for a representative household. Our theoretical model follows that of Casey 
et al. (2006) for improved water service in Brazil. With a given level of utility, the 
household seeks to minimize the expenditure to achieve a certain level of utility. 
The problem of the consumer is then:
min E(W,Y)         
(1)
subject to U=U(W,Y)       
(2)
where W denotes water and Y is a composite good. The consumer will 
minimize the following expenditure function: 
E* =E(PW ,PY ,U)        
(3)
However, universal water supply is a restricted demand since water is 
provided to the consumer on a take it or leave it basis. Therefore, the consumer 
is rather offered W, which the consumer can choose to pay for or not. As a result, 
we can replace PWwith W in the above equation. We can then state the expenditure 
function as: 
E*=E(W,PY , U)        
(4)
For the restricted demand case, the WTP for an improved water service is the 
difference between the two expenditure functions with W1>W0. The compensating 
surplus is given as:  
RP 262 main text_edited-1.indd   6 28/07/2014   09:58:44
Private Sector ParticiPation in ProviSion of Quality Drinking Water in ghana 7
WTP=E(W0 , PY , U0) – E(W1 , PY , U1 )     
(5)
The WTP is the willingness to pay for universal improvement in water supply. 
This is the amount that a household is willing to trade for the improvement in 
water supply, i.e., to give up and still remain on the previous utility level. However, 
the demographic variables could also affect this welfare measure. Denoting 
these demographic variables as d, we can specify the compensating surplus for a 
representative household as:  
WTPi =E(W0 , PY , U0 ;di ) – E(W1 , PY ,U1 ; di )    
(6)
The responses to the scenario allow us to identify the characteristics of 
respondents who offer zero bids and positive bids. In this case, we can specify the 
PROBIT model as:
Pr (R = 1) = X1 β1+ ε1        
(7)
where R = 1 denotes that the respondent indicated a positive bid, X1 is the 
vector of variables and β1 is a vector of parameters. We assume that ε1  is normally 
distributed. Thus, the PROBIT model can be estimated by maximizing the log-
likelihood function:
Pr(R = 1׀ X1) = Φ(β1X1)       
(8)
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
Also, the bid curve can be presented as: 
WTPi = X2 β +ε2        
(9)
where β2 is a vector of unknown parameters, X2 is a vector of explanatory 
variables, and ε2 is the stochastic disturbance term; it is assumed to be independently, 
identically distributed. 
Although there are studies which adopt this specification for the estimation 
of the bid curve, e.g., Casey et al. (2006), there are two potential problems with 
the above formulation. Firstly, in most CVM studies, respondents report “zero 
bids” which might be attributed to genuine “zero bid” and “protest bid” responses. 
Secondly, some of the explanatory variables may suffer from significant missing 
information due to the sensitive nature of those variables. The first issue generates 
self-selection problems. The second problem results in the estimation of bid 
curves with an unrepresentative sample from the population, another source of 
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sample selection bias. The overall effects of the sample selection bias are that 
the stochastic disturbance term will be non-random;  consequently, the estimated 
parameters will be biased.
Heckman (1979) suggests an econometric procedure for solving the sample 
selection problem. The procedure involves the identification of a latent variable z* 
that captures whether or not an individual gives a valid WTP response. The latent 
variable is revealed by an indicator variable zi  that takes on the value of 1 if  pi ≥0 
and the value of 0 otherwise. 
This means that 
zi*>0 if  zi = 1 and  p is observed. 
Alternatively, zi*=0 if  zi= 0 and p  is not observed. 
This latent variable may be determined by a set of explanatory variables. We 
specify this latent variable as: 
zi* = α‘Z + u        
(10)
where Z denotes the vector of explanatory variables of the latent variable. The 
Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) is derived from the latent variable regression, and is 
given as:
λj =  φ(–α ‘Zj) / [ 1– Ф( α‘Zj)]       
(11)
where φ is the standard normal density function and Ф (.)  is the standard 
normal cumulative density function. The IMR is then added as an additional 
explanatory variable in the structural equation, which is modified to:
WTPj = β‘X +γλ +ε*         
(12)
where γ is the covariance between the two stochastic disturbance terms. Fonta 
et al. (2010) uses the Heckman sample selection model on stochastic payment card 
design proposed by Wang (1997) to estimate willingness to pay for the control 
of malaria using larvivorous-eating fish species in Cameroon. The stochastic 
payment card considers a case where there are uncertainties in the commodities 
being valued. Fonta et al. (2010) observe the presence of sample selection bias. 
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94.  Literature review
The challenge of public policy is achieving efficiency vis-à-vis maximum social welfare. A practical approach to welfare analysis in the water sector must consider the cost of water delivery, and the price charged by water 
companies. Typically, the infrastructure policy must also consider how to recover 
the infrastructural cost (Ayogu, 2007). These are closely intertwined with the 
ownership structure, operational efficiency and financial viability. Cost conditions 
are based on an efficient industry configuration (that is, the number and size 
distribution of firms that minimize the total cost of supplying the entire market). 
These issues are mirrored in the current political economy of public service 
delivery (Besley and Ghatak, 2007), where persuasive evidence for the costs and 
benefits are necessary for sound public debate. 
The idea that private enterprises are more efficient than public firms is based 
on the public choice model, which seizes on non-transferability of ownership 
and attenuation of property rights in public firms to account for the differences 
between privately and publicly-owned firms (Alchian, 1965). A study conducted 
by Bhattacharyya et al. (1994) found that there is no basis for such a claim of an 
effect of ownership on the relative efficiency of public and private water utilities 
in the United States. Typically, Bhattacharyya et al. (1994) found that public water 
utilities are more efficient than private ones, and therefore the public ownership of 
water utilities does not reduce incentives to monitor managerial conduct, which is 
inconsistent with theoretical literature as propounded by Alchian (1965). Similar 
conclusions were arrived at by Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), Feigenbaum and 
Teeples (1983) and Lambert et al. (1993). 
The contingent valuation method of estimating WTP for non-marketed goods 
and services (Mitchell and Carson, 1989) was used for this study. The CVM is 
a popular method for assessing value of water quality improvement among 
respondents. Several studies have been carried out in low-income countries 
to determine the affordability and WTP for water and sanitation services 
(Whittington et al., 1990; Whittington and Lauria, 1991; Whittington et al., 1992; 
McPhail, 1993; Altaf et al., 1993; Briscoe, 1993; Griffin et al., 1995; Whittington 
et al., 2002; Ntengwe, 2004; Dutta, 2006; Ahmad et al., 2005). These studies 
implemented CVM studies to assess WTP for improved water supply conditions 
and intended improved government policies on water supply. The studies have 
revealed that despite the high levels of poverty in the low-income countries, many 
households are able and willing to pay for water and sanitation services if the 
public water utilities are run along commercial lines. They also show that demand-
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side information about household preferences and priorities can provide valuable 
inputs into planning in water management. Hence the decision to use the CVM 
to find out whether Ghanaians were willing to pay for PSP in the provision of 
quality water supply both in terms of quantity and quality. Merrett (2002) provides 
a detailed critique of the literature that has applied CVM studies to estimate the 
WTP for water services in low-income countries, whilst Whittington (2004) draws 
attention to ethical issues in using CVM studies in developing countries.
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5.  Methodology
Sample and sampling techniques
The target population for  this study was all the people living in Ghana who would in one way or another use the potable water delivery system. The study 
purposively identified three cities (Accra, Cape Coast and Sunyani) as case studies 
due to the nature of the water supply situation in the three cities. These cities have 
varying systems of water supply, which would help the respondents correctly react 
to the use of private sector participation in improving water supply. A total of 302 
heads of household with at least 100 households from each city sampled from 
randomly selected suburbs of the three cities, formed the sample for the study.
Mode of collection
Structured questionnaires were administered to 302 heads of households to obtain data for analysis. These heads of households were seen as potential 
users of improved water provision who also generally make decisions about the 
use of household income and influence the household’s drinking water-seeking 
behaviour. Therefore, their WTP bids would help determine the value of improved 
quality water provision. The main reason for the use of personal interviews to 
collect data rather than postal questionnaires or telephone interviews is that 
interviews would improve response rates and provide opportunities to check the 
subjects’ understanding of the questions.
Three graduates were recruited and trained as research assistants to help with 
conducting the interviews. They were selected based on their understanding of the 
local dialects so that they could translate the questionnaire into the local dialects 
for the respondents. Using local people to conduct the interviews helped avoid 
compliance bias, since the respondents would not know the sponsor of the study 
and respondents are likely to be more at ease and feel free to talk to people they 
can easily communicate with instead of strangers. The researchers organized 
two days of training for the interviewers. The first day of training was to explain 
the objectives of the study and the survey instrument to them and offered them 
the chance to attempt translations into the local dialect to find out if they could 
translate appropriately to elicit the required response. They were also taught how 
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to establish an enabling environment for frank conversation. 
After the first day of training, each interviewer was given a copy of the 
survey instrument to take home for further study in order to raise any questions 
or concerns they might have on the second day of training. They were not told 
what was going to happen on the second day in order not to prejudice them. The 
second day of training was divided into short sessions where each interviewer 
interviewed the other two in turn, before finally interviewing the principal 
investigator. The principal investigator tried to play the devil’s advocate by being 
as difficult an interviewee as possible. This was to offer us the opportunity to 
observe how they (the interviewers) would conduct the interviews in the field. 
Finally, the interviewers were asked to write a report of how they conducted the 
interviews, emphasizing any problems that they encountered. This was to offer 
the researchers the opportunity to understand the problems they might face in the 
field. After the training, the questionnaire was piloted by the research assistant 
resident in Accra, the result of which informed the review of the questionnaire. 
The data were collected between September and October 2008.  
Survey instrument
The survey instrument, the questionnaire, was designed so that it could be used to collect both qualitative and quantitative data from the respondents 
for analysis. The qualitative data were to be used to aid interpretation of the 
quantitative estimates that would be obtained from the statistical analyses. The 
questionnaire used for the data collection contained the following:
• A series of questions seeking information on the socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics of respondents such as income, sex, education 
level, occupation, marital status, and how they ranked improvement in water 
provision as a national goal. These data were to be used to relate the answers 
given by respondents (to the WTP questions) to the other characteristics of 
the respondent in order to test the internal validity of the study.
• A description of the commodity for which the respondents were requested to 
state how much they were willing to pay, namely improved quality provision 
of potable water. Also, the respondents were asked to rank improvement in 
water provision as a national goal among six other national goals.
• Questions that would determine how much the respondents were willing to 
pay for improved quality provision of potable water in the cities.
WTP elicitation
An open-ended question was asked to determine the maximum amount that respondents were willing to pay as a monthly water bill for improved quality 
and reliable water provision. Closed-ended questions are recommended in CVM 
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studies, however, in close-knit communities closed-ended questions could affect 
the quality of response (Whittington, 1998). The monthly water bill was adopted 
as the payment vehicle since the respondents are familiar with this method of 
paying for water and electricity bills and there is no opposition to this payment 
vehicle. 
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6.  Results
Description of sociodemographic data
Some economists argue that the influence of sociodemographic factors such as gender, marital status, social class and other psychological reasons of demand 
behaviour cannot be ruled out in the theory of demand (see Kennedy, 1992; 
Lipsey and Harbury, 1992). The following sections present the sociodemographic 
data obtained from the field survey, after which they are used to determine how 
they influence the ranking of water improvement programmes as a national 
goal, willingness to vote for PSP in water provision, the monthly water bill, and 
willingness to pay under PSP in water provision. Table 6.1 shows a description of 
the variables used in the study, whereas Table 6.2 shows the summary descriptive 
statistics of the demographic data. The variable LNAWTP is constructed as (WTPi 
+ 1)  in order to be able to compute the natural logarithm of zero bids. 
Table 6.1:  Description of variables used in the study
Variable Description N
ACCRA Variable for location of respondent. It takes 
the value 1 if location is Accra and 0 if 
otherwise
302
CAPE_COAST Variable for location of respondent. It takes 
the value 1 if location is Cape Coast and 0 if 
otherwise 
302
PUBLIC_PIPE Variable for current source of water supply. 
It takes the value of 1 if current source is 
public stand pipe and 0 if otherwise
302
PRIVATE_PIPE Variable for current source of water supply. 
It takes the value of 1 if current source is 
private stand pipe and 0 if otherwise
302
TANKER Variable for current source of water supply. It 
takes the value of 1 if current source is water 
tanker and 0 if otherwise
302
W_DISEASE Variable for the existence of water-borne 
diseases in the area. It takes the value of 1 if 
household member has experienced water-
borne disease in the past and 0 if otherwise
302
continued next page
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W_POTABLE Household assessment of the quality of 
present water supply. It takes the value of 1 
if household deems water to be potable and 
0 if otherwise
301
WATER_BILL Average monthly water bill (in GHC) 286
GENDER Gender of the head of the household. It 
takes the value of 1 if respondent is male 
and 0 if female
300
MARRIED Marital status of the head of household. 
It takes the value of 1 if married and 0 if 
unmarried
292
HOUSE_SIZE Size of the household 280
INCOME Median of monthly income class of the 
household
293
PRI_EDUC Education level variable. It takes the value 
of 1 if head of household completed primary 
education and 0 if otherwise
302
SEC_EDUC Education level variable. It takes the value of 
1 if head of household completed secondary 
education and 0 if otherwise
302
TER_EDUC Education level variable. It takes the value 
of 1 if head of household completed tertiary 
education and 0 if otherwise
301
LNAWTP Natural logarithm of the amount the 
respondents are willing to pay, including 
genuine zero bids.
297
LNAMT Natural logarithm of respondents’ willingness 
to pay amounts excluding zero bids
171
PSP_
CONNECT
Dummy variable to stay connected after 
implementation of PSP
298
PSP_IMPROVE Dummy variable to denote PSP will improve 
water supply
301
RANKW_HIGH Dummy variable for ranking water 
improvement among top three national 
priorities 
302
The heads of 302 households were interviewed for the study. Of this number, 
161 were male (53%) and 141 (47%) were female. The gender structure of this 
sample was slightly male biased as compared to the general population in Ghana. 
According to the 2000 Population and Housing Census (GSS, 2000), 51% of 
Ghana’s population are female and 49% are male. However, for a variety of reasons, 
including cultural beliefs, the head of a household in Ghana tends to be a man 
(GSS, 1999). Hence, since the survey was focused on heads of households, and 
heads of households in Ghana tend to be male, the sample could be representative 
of heads of households in Ghana. This could explain why the sample is skewed in 
favour of males. 
The gender variable is particularly important for access to quality water because 
traditionally, in most households in the developing world, women take care of 
Table 6.1 continued
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household activities, subsistence farming to produce food crops, reproduction and 
mothering. On the other hand, men tend to grow cash crops and have greater access 
to better-paid, non-farm employment because they tend to be highly educated. 
Being the breadwinner gives men much control over family income and major 
decisions such as who fetches water, when and where water is fetched. Gender 
was thus used as a variable to assess how it influenced the respondents’ ranking 
of improvement in water provision as a national goal, respondents’ willingness to 
pay for PSP in water improvement, and the amount they were willing to pay for 
a monthly water bill under PSP. The effect of the respondents’ gender as a factor 
was to be captured in the multivariate analysis by introducing a dummy variable 
so that 0 represented a female respondent and 1 represented a male respondent.
An analysis of the education background of the respondents indicated that 10 
(3.3%) of the respondents had no formal education and 96.7% had completed at 
least primary education (Table 4.2). This was a highly unrepresentative distribution 
of educational level attained in Ghana. Our sample under-represents those with no 
formal education and over-represents those with formal education. GSS (1999: 
11) have found that in Ghana, “one in three females and one in five males has no 
education”. To make it convenient to find the effect of formal education on people’s 
WTP for PSP in water provision, and also the amount they are prepared to pay for 
WTP as monthly water bill under PSP in water provision, the education variable 
was re-categorized into those who had had no formal education and those who 
had had some form of education. A dummy variable was, therefore, introduced to 
capture primary education, secondary education and tertiary education. The base 
category is thus the respondents with no formal education.
Table 6.2:  Descriptive statistics of respondents’ 
sociodemographic characteristics
Variable Summary statistics
Gender (n, %)
 Male
 Female
161, 53.3%
141, 46.7%
Educationa (n, %)
 No formal education
 Basic education
 Secondary education
 Tertiary education
10, 3.3%
69, 23%
84, 28%
139, 46%
Marital status (n, %)
 Married
 Unmarried
199, 65.9%
103, 34.1%
Household size
 Mean
 Range
5.08
1-18
continued next page
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Average monthly water bill
 Mean
 Range
GH¢10.82
GH¢0-GH¢170.00
Mean monthly income GH¢222.22
a  Basic education here refers to what is normally referred to as elementary education 
in Ghana, which is formal education to the age of 15 years.
b  The exchange rate at the time of the survey was GH¢1.00 to US$1
 
Of the 302 respondents, 199 (65.9%) were married and 103 (34.1%) were 
not married. Marital status was represented by a dummy variable where the base 
category is those who are not married and 1 representing those who are married. 
The occupation of individuals usually influences where they live within a 
country. For instance, farmers in Ghana mostly live in the remote rural areas, 
which lack most social and economic infrastructural facilities. It was therefore 
anticipated that the type of occupation respondents were engaged in may influence 
respondents’ willingness to pay to vote for the use of PSP in water provision, 
as well as the amount they would be willing to pay for a monthly water bill for 
improved water supply through PSP. It was also thought that occupation could be 
used to act as a proxy for income in case the data on income were not forthcoming, 
or unreliable. The occupational distribution of respondents indicates that 69, 
constituting 22.8% of the sample, are civil servants, 68, or about 22.5%, are public 
servants, 145, constituting 48% of the sample, are self-employed and 20, 6.6% of 
the sample, are unemployed. 
Inequalities in incomes, whether at individual, national, or international level, 
lead to inequalities in the ability to satisfy basic needs – quality food, water and, 
of course, medical care (IFPMA, 2000)1. As a general rule, we would expect 
that, as income increases, consumption of quality water and sanitation services 
also increases. Evidence from literature shows that income positively influences 
people’s WTP for goods and services. It was therefore expected that people with 
higher incomes would be prepared to pay higher amounts for improved water 
supply than people with relatively lower incomes in Ghana if water is considered 
a normal good. 
It is known that economists prefer the use of money metric utility – income or 
consumption expenditure – as indicator of poverty and living standards (Samuelson, 
1954). Income is generally the measure of choice in developed countries and 
the preferred metric in developing countries is an aggregate of a household’s 
expenditures. The choice of expenditures over income is dictated by a variety of 
difficulties involved in measuring income in developing countries, among which 
the seasonal variability in such earnings and the fact that a large proportion of 
income in developing countries come from self-employment both in and outside 
agriculture. It has been argued, however, that the expenditure approach potentially 
defines the poor group too narrowly (Sahn and Stifel, 2001). This has led some 
authors to suggest the use of an asset index as proxy for measuring economic 
status. However, the reliance on an asset index to measure socioeconomic status 
is unconventional in research about economic disparities, which tends to define 
Table 6.2 continued
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economic status in terms of income and, to some extent, consumption (Sahn and 
Stifel, 2001). An asset index is usually used in studies that do not provide data 
on income and consumption (for example, the Demographic and Health Surveys 
and Living Standards Surveys) and an asset index approach is the only way to 
examine the distributional aspects of the data from an economic perspective. 
Whilst acknowledging that there could be some difficulties in measuring income 
levels in developing countries such as Ghana, leading to a suggestion that an asset 
index or expenditure approach be used instead, it must be noted that both these 
have their own problems in terms of data required and how these are measured 
and valued. Also, it is difficult to understand how the expenditure or asset index 
approach can explain an individual’s ability to pay for their health care.
Table 6.3:  Monthly income range of respondents
Frequency Per cent Valid% Cumulative%
Vali 1 -
 101 -
 201 -
 301 -
 401 -
 501 -
 601 -
 701 -
 801 -
 901 -
 >100
 Total
9
6
5
3
2
7
7
3
3
2
5
30
32.
22,
16.
10.
8.
2.
2.
1.
1.
.
1.
100.
32.
22.
16.
10.
8.
2.
2.
1.
1.
.
1.
100
32
55.
71.
82.
91.
93.
95.
96.
97.
98.
100.
Income in this study is defined as the average monthly income of the head of 
the household (i.e., the respondent). As individuals usually do not like disclosing 
their actual incomes, income ranges were given for respondents to indicate into 
which range their monthly income fell. Table 6.3 shows the monthly incomes of 
the respondents.
The income ranges presented to the respondents in the survey compared very 
favourably (and was almost identical) to that used by other authors in studies 
on Ghana. The average monthly income of the respondents was GH¢222.22. 
By and large, the researchers had no reason to doubt the income data obtained 
from the field survey, because although some respondents were helped by the 
interviewers to recall their productive activities in order to estimate their income 
levels, they reflected the general income levels in the country at the time of the 
survey. The income variable was later transformed into a continuous variable by 
using the midpoints of the ranges. There could have been a measurement error in 
the income variable after the transformation into a continuous variable, hence we 
adopted econometric methods to check and correct for the endogeneity problem. 
We predicted the income of the household to depend on gender, educational level 
of the head of the household, the occupation of the head of the household, and 
other factors. 
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A household in this study was defined as “the number of people who depend 
on the same budget or the number of people who eat from the same pot” (Asenso-
Boadi, 2004). Larger households are more likely to use large volumes of water 
compared to smaller households and it is worth empirically exploring whether the 
size of Ghanaian households influences the willingness to pay for PSP in improved 
water provision, and the amount people are willing to pay for a monthly water bill 
as part of such a project. By the year 2000, the population census indicated that the 
average household size in Ghana was 5.1 (GSS, 2000). The total number of people 
in the households surveyed ranged from 1 to 18. The average household had 5.08 
members, which reflected the average household size obtained from the census.
Respondents were asked to state whether any member of their household had 
become ill from water-borne disease in the previous two years and whether they 
knew of anyone in the locality who had had water-borne disease in the previous two 
years. It was anticipated that if members of a household required medical attention 
due to water-borne diseases, then the head of household would be willing to vote, 
and also willing to pay, for an improvement in water provision even through a 
PSP. From the field survey, only 15 respondents (5%) had a household member 
who had suffered from water-borne disease in the last two years and this did not 
significantly differentiate between the amounts people were willing to pay for PSP 
in water provision.
Table 6.4 shows the main sources of water supply as stated by the respondents.
Table 6.4:  Source of domestic water supply
Sources of water supply Number Percentage
Private stand pipe at home 149 49.34
Public stand pipe 82 27.15
Private borehole 38 12.58
Public borehole 19 6.29
Water tankers 8 2.65
Other sources of water 6 1.99
Total 302 100.00
As can be seen from Table 6.4, 149 of the respondents (representing 49%) 
get their main water supply through a private stand pipe connected to their homes 
while approximately 9% rely on water tankers and public boreholes for their water 
supply. In terms of quality of water supply, 217 of the respondents (representing 
nearly 72%) indicated that their current water supply was of good quality and 218 
respondents (representing 72.2%) indicated that their water supply was potable in 
the sense that they could drink it straight from the tap. The average amount spent 
on water per month ranged from GH¢0 to GH¢170 with a mean of GH¢10.82. In 
the three months preceding the survey, the highest amount respondents spent on 
water ranged from GH¢0 to GH¢200 with a mean of GH¢16.52; and the lowest 
amount paid for water ranged from GH¢0 to GH¢120 with a mean of GH¢9.60.
It is believed that how individuals rank improvement in water provision as a 
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national goal could influence their choice whether to have PSP and their willingness 
to pay for PSP in the provision of improved water supply. To find out how much 
respondents value their water supply, they were asked to rank water improvement 
as a national goal among six others, namely, education; old-age assistance; 
sanitation; recreational facilities; road construction; and provision of housing. The 
list of national goals was adapted from the work of Asenso-Boadi (2004) who 
sought to estimate people’s willingness to pay for health care. This material was 
used for further analysis to determine how ranking of water improvement as a 
national goal influences the willingness to pay to vote for PSP in water provision, 
and the amount individuals would be willing to pay for their monthly water bill 
under a PSP regime if the government asked them to do so. Thus it is believed that 
respondents’ ranking of water improvement would help to reflect on how much 
they were willing to pay for an improved water supply system and whether they 
would vote for PSP in water supply. 
Table 6.5 shows the distribution of the responses given by the respondents in 
their ranking of water improvement as a national goal. Out of the total respondents, 
62 (20.5%) ranked water improvement first; 74 (24.5%) ranked it second; 92 
(30.5%) ranked it third; 38 (12.6%) ranked it fourth; 24 (7.9%) ranked it fifth; and 
6 (2%) ranked it sixth and seventh. That is, 75.5% of the respondents ranked water 
improvement among the top three national priorities as a national goal and only 
24.5% ranked it below third. From this, we can conclude that there is significant 
demand for water quality improvement. 
Table 6.5:  Ranking of water improvement as a national goal
Rankings Frequency Percentage 
Ranked first 62 20.5
Ranked second 74 24.5
Ranked third 92 30.5
Ranked fourth 38 12.6
Ranked fifth 24 7.9
Ranked sixth 6 2.0
Ranked seventh 6 2.0
Total 302 100.0
  
To help find out how respondents’ ranking of water improvement influences 
their willingness to pay for PSP in improved water provision, and the amount they 
would be willing to pay for a monthly water bill, the ranking of water improvement 
variable was recategorized into those who ranked it high and those who ranked it 
low. Here, “ranked high” refers to those who ranked water improvement among 
the top three national priorities;2  and “ranked low” refers to those who ranked 
water improvement lower than in the top third of national goals. 
When respondents were asked their views about a water improvement 
programme that was described in the questionnaire as “if a water provision system 
is put in place such that water flows 24 hours a day, quality of water is good 
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(you can drink direct from the tap), and there is accurate and easily accessible 
billing…” (see question 16a of the questionnaire, Appendix 3), the majority 
(52.3%) stated that ownership of such an improvement did matter in terms of 
performance. Table 6.6 shows respondents’ preferences for ownership of a water 
improvement programme.
Table 6.6:  Preferred mode of operation of water improvement 
programme
Preferred ownership structure Frequency Percentage
Government 80 26.49
Private 40 13.25
Government – private in 
competition
79 26.16
Government – private in 
partnership
103 34.11
Total 302 100.00
 
As can be seen from Table 6.6, the majority of respondents (about 74%) 
would want private sector participation in water provision either on its own or 
in competition and/or in partnership with government. When asked whether they 
were aware of any attempt by the government to involve the private sector in the 
provision of water, the majority (64.2%) said they were aware of it. A majority 
of the respondents, 231, representing 76.5%, held the view that private sector 
participation in the water sector would improve water provision. We conclude 
that there is no significant aversion to engaging the private sector in ensuring 
access to water. This could be a direct response to the huge demand for a water 
improvement programme we found earlier. Asked whether they would vote for 
PSP in Water Improvement Programme (WIP) in their area, 246 respondents, 
representing 81.5%, responded in the affirmative. Asked what they would do if 
the implementation of the WIP came with higher monthly water bills, the majority 
of respondents (about 61%) indicated they would stay connected to the system 
whilst 11.6% did not know what they would do in such a situation. 
The amount that respondents were willing to pay for private sector participation 
in water improvement ranged from GH¢1.00 to GH¢160.00 per month, with 
a mean of GH¢13.42. This means that WTP is higher than the monthly water 
expenditure reported for different studies. Firstly, the mean WTP is greater 
than the mean household monthly water bill of GH¢10.82 found in our study. 
According to Engel et al. (2005), the average monthly per capita expenditure for 
domestic water is between GH¢3–GH¢4. Thus, given an average household size 
of 4 to 5, the total household monthly water expenditure is between GH¢1.50 and 
GH¢2.00. Compare this with the actual expenditure on water. The distribution of 
these amounts is shown in the histogram below (Figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1:  Histogram of amount water users are willing to pay in 
level form
Regression results
The multivariate analysis starts with the PROBIT model to identify the factors that influence the willingness to pay for the WIP, which may accompany the 
private sector participation in water provision. However, as indicated earlier, there 
is the potential problem of sample selection that could result in biased estimates 
(Heckman, 1979). As a result, we first estimated a Heckman two-stage sample 
selection model. The results of this estimation are presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix 1. The results indicated that there is no sample selection problem. Thus 
we estimated the PROBIT and ordinary least square equations separately. This 
can be inferred from the statistical insignificance of the Inverse Mills Ratio. The Z 
score is -0.54 with the p-value of 0.588. 
First, we presented the PROBIT model concerning the willingness to pay 
for private sector participation in the provision of water. This would permit us 
to identify the characteristics of those who provided zero bids and those who 
indicated positive bids. Since we anticipated measurement problems with regards 
to the income variable, we estimated two models: an ordinary PROBIT model 
and an instrumental variable PROBIT model. The results are presented in Table 
6.7. The dependent variable is the willingness to pay higher water bills when PSP 
is implemented. The dependent variable is a dummy variable which assumes the 
value of 1 when the respondent is willing to pay higher water bills, and 0 otherwise. 
RP 262 main text_edited-1.indd   22 28/07/2014   09:58:49
Private Sector ParticiPation in ProviSion of Quality Drinking Water in ghana 23
Models 1 and 2 in Table 6.7 are the ordinary PROBIT estimations and models 
3 and 4 are the instrumental variable PROBIT estimations. Models 1 and 3 are 
estimated according to the assumption that education affects only income. Models 
2 and 4 are the counterparts of models 1 and 3 when we relax the assumption 
that educational background (captured by education dummies) affects willingness 
to pay for water quality improvement both directly and indirectly through the 
income variable. The instruments for income in models 2 and 4 comprise gender 
of the respondent, dummy variables for self-employment, employment in civil 
and public service, and dummy variables for education and household size. 
Table 6.7:  Results of the PROBIT and instrumental variable 
PROBIT models
Independent variables [1] [2] [3] [4]
ACCRA  -0.09273890  -0.0364798  -0.0145838 0.0050149
(0.2545334) (0.2563054) 0.2564585 (0.2624142)
CAPE_COAST  -0.29801910  -0.2310068  -0.1960835  -0.1983514
(0.2579897) (0.2597016) (0.2563933) (0.2593226)
PSP_CONNECT 0.7918857*** 0.7677385*** 0.6611671*** 0.6971435***
(0.1830575) (0.1869837) (0.2081684) (0.2495463)
WATER_PUBLIC  -0.2070105  -0.2058185  -0.1297022  -0.1330138
(0.2916594) (0.2912168) (0.2910706) (0.3274217)
WATER_PRIVATE 0.1184014 0.0805421  -0.0783113  -0.049519
(0.2599324) (0.2679687) (0.2974382) (0.3588354)
WATER_TANKER 0.292201 0.2115379 0.1565906 0.0919300
(0.5149722) (0.495279) (0.524392) (0.5522107)
HOUSESIZE   -0.0632101*   -0.0735493**   
-0.0649117**
 -.0717433**
(0.032585) (0.0330298) (0.0317743) (0.0337202)
GENDER 0.0703306 0.0597141  -0.0169444 0.0080913
(0.1833225) (0.1888869) (0.1864321) (0.2030044)
PSP_IMPROVE 0.7090277*** 0.7082003*** 0.6037265*** .6371733**
(0.2106438) (0.2171771) (0.228767) (0.2743298)
INCOME 0.0691400 0.0409328 0.2012085* 0.1858041
(0.0627330) (0.0654236) (0.1053927) (0.2537969)
RANKW_HIGH 0.1965700 0.1636432 0.0996018 0.0995892
(0.2117340) (0.2145814) (0.2272303) (0.2500447)
PRI_EDUCATION  -0.8431205  -0.8724601
(0.5917912) (0.5891381)
SEC_EDUCATION  -0.50550230  -0.5150419
(0.5129121) (0.5106429)
continued next page
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TER_EDUCATION  -0.2159101  -0.4962261
(0.5531658) (0.7199632)
CONSTANT 0.0233608 0.517335  -0.1134535 0.3750970
 (0.4666546) (0.6477977) (0.4654131) (0.7021074)
OBSERVATIONS 264 264 264 264
WALD CHI  SQUARE 47.35*** 48.81*** 51.23*** 50.45***
PSEUDO R SQUARE 0.1552  0.1686  
The robust standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, 
*** Significant at 1%. The dependent variable for all four models is willingness to pay 
higher water bills. 
We performed parametric and semi-parametric tests for both estimation 
procedures. For the parametric test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that our 
initial PROBIT model is correctly specified at a 5% significance level for the 
instrumental variable PROBIT, and at all conventional levels for the PROBIT 
estimation procedure. The diagrams for the semi-parametric tests are provided 
in Figures A2.1 and A2.2 in Appendix 2. Three variables remain statistically 
significant, irrespective of the model. These variables are the dummy variable for 
the belief that PSP will improve water quality (PSP_IMPROVE), the size of the 
household (HOUSESIZE), and the dummy variable for the persistence of water 
connection after the PSP is implemented (PSP_CONNECT). The income variable 
is only statistically significant under the instrumental variable PROBIT estimation. 
None of the location dummies are statistically significant at the conventional 
levels. Thus we can conclude that the willingness to pay for the PSP in water 
provision is mainly driven by the extent to which the household believes that 
PSP will improve water quality and whether the household will remain connected 
after the implementation of the PSP. The only socioeconomic variable that is 
statistically significant is the household size, and this result indicates that bigger 
households would be less willing to pay for the PSP in water provision.
We have a good specification of the instrumental variable PROBIT. The 
test statistic for the Wald test is 50.17 at 11 degrees of freedom. Thus the model 
is significant at all conventional levels. The Wald test of exogeneity was also 
performed on the income variable that we anticipated would be fraught with 
measurement errors (see Wooldridge, 2002). The null hypothesis is that the 
income variable is exogenous. The test statistic is 2.17 and we fail to reject the 
null hypothesis at all conventional levels. 
We also estimated four different models to identify the factors that could 
determine the bids or the amount the households were willing to pay for water 
quality improvement. These models are presented in Table 6.8. Model 1 is the semi-
natural logarithmic model of the full sample; model 2 is the instrumental variable 
(IV) specification of model 1; model 3 is the semi-natural logarithmic specification 
of positive bids only; and model 4 is the instrumental variable specification of 
model 3. In the full sample, we have both positive bids and zero bids, however, 
in the positive bids we only considered the households with only positive bids for 
water quality improvement. The C tests for endogeneity were reported for the two 
Table 6.7 continued
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IV estimations, i.e., 2 and 4 in Table 6.8. The test statistics reported are 0.099 and 
0.113, respectively. Based on these test statistics, we reject the endogeneity of the 
income variable. However, following the recommendations of Shea (1997) based 
on the partial R-square, we reject the null hypothesis at all conventional levels 
meaning that kth canonical correlation is zero. This means that 2SLS will perform 
well. We also found ample evidence in support of our earlier conclusion drawn 
from the PROBIT models that there is no sample selection problem. Models 1 and 
3 remain almost similar apart from the small changes in the estimated coefficients 
with the same sign. First, the specification of the two regressions are a good fit, 
both are significant at less than 1%. The adjusted R-squares of the two regressions 
are almost the same. Also, the two regression results produce similar results in 
terms of the variables that are statistically significant.   
Public policies are universal as they affect both those who support and 
those who do not support the policy. For example, when a water improvement 
programme is implemented, it will affect the respondents who supported the water 
improvement programme and those who did not support the policy. Therefore, the 
preferences of both those who support and those who do not support the public 
policy need to be included in models that seek to evaluate these public policies. 
Thus we can include their values in the estimation of our regressions. However, for 
comparison purposes, we also presented the results in the case of those who made 
positive bids only. Although the household size is statistically significant in the 
PROBIT estimation, it is not significant in the bid function. Moreover, rankings 
for water quality improvement and gender of the head of the household are not 
significant in the bids quoted by the households. Also, the respondents from Accra 
quote bids that are statistically different from the base category, i.e. Sunyani. The 
dependent variable for models 1 and 2 is LNWTP. The dependent variable for 
models 3 and 4 is LNAMT. 
Table 6.8:  Results of the semi-logarithmic specification of bid 
function
Independent 
variables
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ACCRA 0.2738342*** 0.2871157*** 0.2076553* 0.215886**
(0.1039308) (0.1058901) (0.1226637) (0.1214607)
CAPE_COAST 0.07654330 0.0817678  -0.1401462  -0.1376778
(0.0988231) (0.0990859) (0.1138365) (0.1133958)
WATER BILL 0.0899061*** 0.0878019*** 0.0821137*** 0.0811355***
(0.0084816) (0.0086613) (0.0101906) (0.010319)
WATER BILL 
SQUARE
  -0.0006051***  -0.0005843***   -0.0005243***   -0.0005148***
(0.0001286) (0.0001305) ( 0.0001291) (0.0001315)
GENDER 0.02402600 0.0106389  0.0488194 0.0436142
(0.0743177) (0.0799658) (0.0916400) (0.0950123)
continued next page
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MARRIED  -0.1576431*  -0.1645117*   -0.2172285**   -0.2218098**
(0.0840584) (0.0839587) (0.1002104) (0.0998721)
HOUSE SIZE 0.0161477 0.0167926 0.0286773* 0.0285049*
(0.0146255) (0.0141053) (0.0155809) (0.0158519)
INCOME 0.0575441*** 0.0775265** 0.0506594** 0.0599596
(0.0194041) (0.0391444) (0.0213705) (0.0431511)
RANKW HIGH 0.10480600 0.0972919 0.1444311 0.1392676
(0.0897265) (0.0914544) (0.1047462) (0.1133235)
WATER QUALITY 0.2663656*** 0.2610603*** 0.2112742** 0.2106307**
(0.08376900) (0.0846374) (0.0983544) (0.0986977)
CONSTANT 0.7478895*** 0.7175757*** 0.9804069*** 0.966361***
 (0.1646003) (0.1645465) (0.1800975) (0.1679916)
OBSERVATIONS 240 240 171 171
F STATISTIC 61.29*** 55.15*** 55.02*** 50.72***
R SQUARE 
(CENTRED)
0.6833 0.6816 0.6870 0.6866
*Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses.
The variables that are statistically significant at different levels of significance 
appear to remain the same over the different model specifications. From the results 
we can conclude that respondents who are resident in Accra quoted higher bids 
relative to the base category, Sunyani. This is because the dummy variable for Accra 
is statistically significant, irrespective of the model. This could be interpreted in 
several ways. However, one plausible interpretation is that residents in Accra face 
a more acute water situation. Moreover, the current water bills that the respondents 
are paying determine the bids quoted for the private sector participation for 
improvement in water provision. The water bill variable is statistically significant 
for all four model specifications at less than a 1% significance level. However, the 
water bill increases with the bids at a decreasing rate. This can be inferred from 
the fact that the square of water bill (WATERBILL_SQUARE) has a negative 
coefficient and is statistically significant in all the model specifications at all 
conventional levels. This finding could be interpreted as the persistence of higher 
water bills: those already paying higher water bills provide higher bids to support 
the private sector participation in water provision. 
The marital status of the head of the household is also statistically significant 
in the bid function in all model specifications. It means that households where 
the heads of the household are married quoted lower bids for private sector 
participation in water provision. This could be an indication of gender division 
of labour since heads of households are more likely to be male, and females tend 
to be responsible for water provision in most households. The income variable is 
suspected to be endogenous. This is the main reason for the estimation of the two-
Table 6.8 continued 
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stage least squares estimations. The income is assumed to depend on the location 
of the household, gender of the head of the household, marital status of the head of 
household, size of the household, education background of the head of household, 
and dummy variables to represent whether the head of household is working as a 
civil servant, public servant or in the private sector. Thus, we rely on the location 
of the household, educational attainment of the head of household and dummy 
variables for the household head working as a civil servant, public servant or in 
the private sector to ensure exclusion restrictions. Although these variables could 
affect the bids directly, we are implicitly assuming here that these variables only 
affect bids through the income. The income equation yields a good fit. The F 
statistics for both specifications are significant at 1%. The income variable in the 
bid function is statistically significant in three of the four model specifications. 
Thus we conclude that bids are affected by the income level of the household. 
We performed tests on the instrument, i.e., tests for weak instruments and 
under-identification. Various tests can assess the strength of the instruments used in 
the estimation. For under-identification, both the Kleibergen-Paap rK LM statistic 
and Kleibergen-Paap Wald statistic reject the null hypothesis of weak instruments 
at all conventional levels. The Kleibergen-Paap rK LM statistic and Kleibergen-
Paap Wald statistic are 49.35 and 89.02 for models 2 and 4, respectively. Under 
this test, the null hypothesis is that the matrix of the reduced form coefficients has 
a rank of K 1 – 1. The null hypothesis means that the reduced form equation is 
under-identified. For weak identification, the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald  test was 
used. The null hypothesis is that the equation is weakly identified. The test statistic 
is 13.91 and we therefore reject the null hypothesis for weak instruments 10% 
maximal IV relative bias. Thus, given our specification, our instruments performed 
quite well. For the weak instrument with robust inference, all three reported tests, 
the Anderson-Rubin Wald test, Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM 
S statistic, reject the null hypothesis at a 5% significance level. The null hypothesis 
here is that β INCOME = 0. This means that the coefficient of income in the structural 
equation is statistically different from zero. The same conclusions also hold for the 
positive bid sample. 
Thus we can conclude that there is ample evidence that bids quoted by the 
respondents depend on the income of the households. Households with relatively 
higher income levels provided higher bids for private sector participation in 
improving water provision. This can also be inferred from the fact that whether 
households remain connected to water supply after the implementation of the plan 
depends on the income level of the households. Households with relatively higher 
income levels indicated they would remain connected to water supply even after 
the implementation of the PSP. There is also evidence of persistent high water bills 
in that households that are paying higher water bills provided higher bids for the 
water improvement programme as well. 
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7.  Conclusion and policy 
implications
We have evidence that there is an almost universal preference for water quality improvement among our sample. More than 75% of the sample ranked water quality improvement very high (i.e., among the top three) 
as a national priority. These respondents also believe private sector engagement 
would improve the water quality. We can infer from this result that the respondents 
seek quality water and are likely to pay for this programme. 
We established that the income level of the household is a key determinant of the 
bid quoted in support of the water improvement programme. This finding provides 
evidence in support of opponents in the water privatization debate in Ghana, that 
the privatization of water will marginalize the poor in terms of access to basic water 
supply. However, there is also a preference for water quality improvement. This 
creates the need for expansion in water delivery, which can be provided either 
by the public or the private sector. We, can, therefore view these two contrasting 
evidences as a typical public policy dilemma in which we have both losers and 
winners in public policies. Given the huge demand for water quality improvement, 
we tend to argue that the winners can potentially compensate the losers. In the 
famous theory of public policy, the number of policy instruments should be at least 
equal to the number of policy objectives. Thus, we found evidence that although 
private sector engagement in water provision may improve water quality, it may not 
increase access to water supply among the poor. However, water privatization with 
a corresponding government programme, especially for poor households, could 
produce the double dividends of quality and universal access that characterize the 
public debate in Ghana.
We outlined a plan to undertake a study to establish whether Ghanaians were 
willing to pay for private sector involvement in the provision of improved and 
continuous water supply. Our method for carrying out the study was the contingent 
valuation method, whereby randomly selected heads of households were requested 
to indicate their willingness to pay, and the maximum amounts that they would be 
willing to pay for the improved water supply. The study offers data complementary 
to policy and research on institutions and service delivery. We found that there is a 
huge demand for improvement in water supply and a general notion is that PSP in 
water delivery might deliver water quality improvement. The mean willingness to 
pay for water quality improvement is about GH¢13.42 (US$12) per month. Also, 
we found that PSP in water delivery that increases water bills could reduce access 
to water among low income households. Therefore, PSP with a complementary 
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government programme that increases access to water for low income households 
could provide better water quality without reducing access to water among low 
income households. 
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Notes
1 International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (2000).
2 75.5% of the respondents ranked health improvement as the first, second or 
third most important national goal and only 24.5% ranked it below third.
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Appendix A: Tables
Table A.1: Results of the Heckman two-stage estimation procedure
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z
wtppspwip     
WATER QUALTIY .0591972 .3325921 0.18 0.859
WATER_BILL -.0004726 .0131074 -0.04 0.971
GENDER .0627799 .2957976 0.21 0.832
MARRIED -.0039791 .3172032 -0.01 0.990
INCOME -.0043301 .078565 -0.06 0.956
PRI_EDUC -.2071315 .9371772 -0.22 0.825
SEC_EDUC (JSS) -.1327081 .8460182 -0.16 0.875
SEC_EDUC (SSS) -.0940338 .8368599 -0.11 0.911
TER_EDUC -.0835187 .9134237 -0.09 0.927
CIVIL_SERVICE .0040083 .6995533 0.01 0.995
PUBLIC_SERVICE .0037452 .6196636 0.01 0.995
SELF_EMPLOY .0648862 .6778119 0.10 0.924
PSP_CONNECT .2280971 .2967017 0.77 0.442
PUBLIC_PIPE .0883846 .6763529 0.13 0.896
PRIVATE_PIPE -.0883246 .6583765 -0.13 0.893
WATER_TANKER -.1437138 .7079862 -0.20 0.839
HOUSE_SIZE -.0277738 .0503695 -0.55 0.581
W_POTABLE -.0408457 .3987287 -0.10 0.918
W_DISEASE -.0822686 .4017258 -0.20 0.838
PSP_IMPROVE .2461726 .3349666 0.73 0.462
CONSTANT .6200188 1.281936 0.48 0.629
lnawtp     
WATER QUALITY -.4850004 .8376523 -0.58 0.563
ACCRA 7.152648 . . .
CAPECOAST .525221 .86607 0.61 0.544
WATER_BILL .0811599 .1044422 0.78 0.437
GENDER -.3240713 .5950723 -0.54 0.586
continued next page
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MARRIED -.307877 .5732908 -0.54 0.591
INCOME .2309739 .255332 0.90 0.366
CONSTANT 1.951802 1.500914 1.30 0.193
mills
lambda -2.046098 3.765853 -0.54 0.587
Table A.1 continued
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Appendix B: Figures
Figure B.1: Lowess smoothing graph for semi-parametric test for 
IVPROBIT
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Figure B.2: Lowess smoothing graph for semi-parametric test for 
PROBIT
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Appendix C: Questionnaire
Private sector participation in the provision of quality drinking water in 
urban areas in Ghana: Are the people willing to pay?
Household Questionnaire
Good morning/afternoon/evening. I am from the Department of Economics, 
University of Cape Coast. I am here to administer a questionnaire on behalf of a 
lecturer of this University. You have been randomly selected to participate in an 
economic decision making experiment.  We promise that the responses you give 
will be treated with strict confidentiality. Your responses will be added to those 
of other respondents for a general analysis so there will be no way of tracing 
your response back to you after the analysis is done. 
DO YOU AGREE TO PARTICIPATE?
a) Yes  [  ]
b) No  [  ]
 
NB: Interviewer should fill in the spaces below & tick where applicable
Name of Interviewer ……………………………………….
Date of interview …………………………………………..
Time of interview ………………………………………….
Location (City, Town, Village) …………………………….
Questions 
1.  How would you rank improvement in water supply among other national 
goals? (Please rank in order of priority from 1 – 7; with 1 being of the highest 
priority).
(i) Education Improvement   [   ]
(ii) Old-Age assistance    [   ]
(iii) Health Improvement    [   ]
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(iv) Water Improvement    [   ]
(v) Recreational Facilities   [   ]
(vi) Roads Construction    [   ]
(vii) Provision of Housing   [   ]
2.  What is your main source of domestic water? 
(a) Private stand pipe at home  [   ]
(b) Public standpipe                      [   ]
(c)  Private borehole                      [   ]
(d)  Public borehole                       [   ]
(e)  Water tankers                         [   ]
(f)  Other(s), specify 
…………………………………………………………….
                ………………………………………………………………………………
3.  How often does water flow in your house (If (a) and (b) are your sources of 
domestic water)?       
(a)  Daily      [   ]                     
(b)  Once a week          [   ]
(c)  Twice a week         [   ]                       
(d)  Other(s) specify ………………………………………………………
4.  What is the average duration of water supply if available?
(a)  I hour                        [   ]
(b)  2 hours                     [   ] 
(c)  3 hours                     [   ]
(d)  the whole day          [   ]    
(e)  Other(s) specify …………………………………………….
5.  How much on the average do you spend on water per month? 
 Amt. in GH cedis …………………………………………….
6.  What was the highest amount you paid for water per month over the past 
three months?
 Amt.in GH cedis …………………………………………….
7.  What was the lowest amount you paid for water per month over the past 
three months?
 Amt.in GH cedis ………………………………………………..
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8.  In your opinion, is water supply in your area   
(a)  good quality     [   ]      
(b)  bad quality       [   ]
9. Is your water potable? 
(a)  Yes      [   ]                 
(b)  No       [   ]
10. If yes to q 9, have you or a member of your household become ill from water-
borne diseases in the past two years? 
(a)  Yes   [   ]                                     
(b)  No   [   ]
11.  If no to q 9, how much do you have to spend in a month to improve water 
quality for consumption? e.g. expenditure on sachet water, chemicals to 
improve domestic water  usage, etc   
 Amt GH cedis ……………….. per month
12.  Do you know of any other person who has become ill from water-borne 
diseases in the past two years?  
(a)  Yes   [   ]  
(b)  No   [   ]                                                                                   
13. Are you aware the Government has engaged the private sector in the 
provision of water?  
(a) Yes   [   ]                            
(b) No   [   ] 
14.  Do you think private sector participation will improve the provision of 
water?    
(a)  Yes     [   ]                   
(b)  No      [   ]
15.  What would be the most preferred model of water supply? 
(a)  Government                                                [   ]
(b)  Private                                                        [   ]      
(c)  Government and private in competition    [   ]
(d)  Government and private in partnership     [   ]
RP 262 main text_edited-1.indd   41 28/07/2014   09:58:51
ReseaRch PaPeR 26242
16 a.  If a water provision system is put in place such that water flows 24 
hours a day, quality of water is good (which you can drink direct 
from the tap), and there is accurate and easily accessible billing, 
would it matter who the owner of such system is? i.e. does it matter if it 
is privately or publicly owned?
 (a)  Yes   [   ]                                      
 (b)  No   [   ]
16 b.  If Yes to 16a, kindly state your preference 
 (a) Private  [   ]        
 (b) Government [   ]
17.  Suppose that the Government of Ghana and a private company jointly 
implement a Water Improvement Programme [WIP] that ensures that water 
quality description in q 16a is implemented. However, this will lead to an 
increase in your water bill. Would you be willing to pay the higher water bill?
(a)  Yes   [   ]
(b)  No    [   ]
18.  I want you to suppose that the improved water service for households in 
cities (Accra, Cape Coast, Sunyani) with public private sector through 
GWCL would result in an increase in your total monthly water bill. For this 
new Water Improvement Programme described in q17 would you vote for 
the implementation of the Water Improvement Programme?  
(a)   Yes   [   ]
(b)   No    [   ]
19.  Looking at your current disposable income, how much will your household 
be willing to pay for such an improved water delivery service described in 
q16a above?
 Amt (GHC) …………………………………………
20.  Now, I want you to suppose that in fact most people did vote for the plan 
to improve the water supply system. Assume that the typical household’s 
monthly water bill for water increased over and above what your household 
was willing to pay in q19 above, what do you think your household would 
do?
i)    Stay connected and pay the higher water bill      [   ]
ii)   Disconnect and find water elsewhere                   [   ]
iii)  Don’t know                                                           [   ]
21.  If you prefer (i) in q20, what is the maximum amount you would like to pay?
 Amt (GHC) …………………………………………
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22.  If you prefer (ii) in q20, kindly state what sources of water your household 
will use?
(a) ………………………………………………………………
(b)  ……………………………………………………………...
(c)  ………………………………………………………………
23.  Which of the options of implementation would you prefer?
(a)  Government                                               [   ]
(b)  Private                                                        [   ]     
(c)  Government and private in competition    [   ]
(d)  Government and private in partnership     [   ]
Demographic data
1.  Sex of respondent            
(a)  Male         [   ]                     
(b)  Female     [   ]
2.  Marital status                 
(a)  Unmarried   [   ]           
(b)  Married        [   ]  
3.  Size of household                              
(a)  Number of adults ……………….  
(b)  Number of children (below 18 years) ……………..
4.  Occupation
(a)  Civil Servant  [   ]  (c)  Public Servant  [   ]
(b)  Self employed  [   ]  (d)  Unemployed  [   ]
 Kindly state your actual employment ………………………………………..
  ……………………………………………………………………………
…………
5.  Monthly income level in GHC  (Interviewer tick the box that is applicable)
(a)   0 – 100        [   ]           (g)  601 – 700        [   ]
(b)  101 – 200     [   ]                  (h)  701 – 800        [   ]
(c)  201 – 300     [   ]             (i)   801 – 900        [   ]
(d)  301 – 400     [   ]               (j)   901 – 1000      [   ]     
(e)  401 – 500     [   ]           (k)  Above 1000     [   ]
(f)  501 -  600     [   ]                    
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6.  Educational background    
(a)  No schooling             [   ]                 
(b)  Primary                     [   ]                 
(c)  Junior Secondary      [   ]         
(d)  Senior Secondary     [   ]    
(e)  Tertiary                    [   ]
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